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Abstract: This paper addresses the question of whether independent directors of the 
bidding firm are effective monitors during acquisitions and whether this effectiveness 
is impaired when the independent directors serve on multiple boards. The choice of the 
acquisition setting, where the board of directors is known to be engaged in active 
decision-making, facilitates a direct test of the role of independent directors as 
effective, external monitors of the board’s activities. We employ three indicators of the 
bidding board’s performance in making optimal acquisition decisions: the acquisition 
premium (benchmarked against subsequent performance), a new indicator comprising 
the conflicts of interest associated with the acquisitions (conflicted acquisitions), and 
the post-acquisition stock performance. The results suggest that more independent 
boards and busy independent directors on the bidding firm’s board are associated with 
more effective acquisition decisions by the board. However, busy independent directors 
are associated with less effective acquisition decisions when the bidding firm has 
higher free cash flows consistent with Jensen (1986). We also find that busy executive 
directors on the bidding firm’s board have no implications for the effectiveness of 
acquisition decisions unless the director is a busy chairperson or busy CEO both of 
whom are associated with less effective acquisition decisions. This paper contributes 
direct evidence on the effectiveness of bidding firm independent directors in their role 
as monitors and decision-makers.  
 




This paper addresses the question of whether independent directors of the bidding firm 
are effective monitors during acquisitions and whether this effectiveness is impaired when 
independent directors serve on multiple boards. Specifically, this study examines the 
association between the independence and busyness of directors and three indicators of their 
board’s performance in making acquisition decisions: (1) post acquisition stock price relative 
to the acquisition premium; (2) a new measure of the acquisitions involving a conflict of 
interest (as defined in Section 2.2.2); and (3) post acquisition share price performance. The 
paper also examines whether acquisition decisions by the board are adversely affected when 
the board comprises busy executive directors, busy chairpersons, or busy CEOs. 
The assumption underlying the push to more independent boards is that boards which 
are not independent, or have busy independent directors serving on multiple boards, allow the 
insiders to take control of the board.1 Boards dominated by insiders are less likely to discipline 
managers (Jensen 1986). Busy directors are assumed to apply less effort to their board duties as 
their number of directorships increases. The resulting weak board, along with the information 
advantage of the inside directors (see Ravina and Sapienza, 2009), negatively impacts the 
performance of the board. That is, rather than making decisions in the interests of the company 
as a whole, powerful insiders presiding over a weak board, make decisions for other reasons 
such as empire building (Jensen, 1986) and wealth transfers away from shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). However, competing theory suggests that a less independent board and 
more insider power are not routinely dysfunctional and may in fact reflect an optimal solution 
to the firm’s overall governance needs (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2008).  
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 The Australian Shareholders’ Association (ASA) argues that the board workload is linked to the incidence of 
corporate conflict and distress. For example, the ASA cites the high workload of four non-executive directors on 
the board of the packaging company, Amcor Ltd (Galacho 2004). Amcor Ltd. was investigated for cartel activities 
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The ASA argued that the four non-executive 
directors, from the Amcor board totalling seven directors in all, sat on too many boards culminating in an 
unmanageable workload, and impaired performance as board members (Moullakis, 2004). The Council of 
Institutional Investors in the United States and the Financial Reporting Council in the United Kingdom (UK) 
make similar claims and arguments for limits on the number of directorships held by directors. 
To distinguish among these theories, this study extends the prior literature by focusing 
the analysis on acquisition decisions over which effective independent directors exert their 
influence. This design provides a direct test of the link between board independence and 
busyness and board performance for two reasons: (1) acquisitions are material investment 
decisions that affect the welfare of the company as a whole; and (2) managers make acquisition 
proposals that are subject to board approval and the board is ultimately responsible for the 
outcome of the acquisition decisions. The negative decision outcomes from non-independent 
boards with directors that are too busy to attend to the board’s activities may include: the 
overpayment of acquisition premiums relative to the performance capacity of the target 
operating with the bidder in the future, poor post-acquisition performance, and engagement in 
more conflicted acquisitions.  
We find for a sample of 218 Australian companies making acquisitions that more 
independent boards and busier independent directors on the bidding firm’s board are associated 
with acquisitions that have a lower acquisition premium relative to future performance and 
overall higher three year ahead stock performance. However, for firms with higher free cash 
flows, the less busy independent directors are associated with better acquisition outcomes 
(lower acquisition premium relative to future performance and higher overall future stock 
performance). Further tests decomposing the board suggest that the outcomes of the board’s 
acquisition decisions depend on who is busy. Specifically, busy executive directors on the 
bidding firm’s board have no implications for the effectiveness of acquisition decisions unless 
the director is a busy Chairperson or busy CEO both of whom are associated with less effective 
acquisition decisions by the board.  
This study contributes in several ways to the literature on the performance implications 
of board composition and busyness. First, there are controversies surrounding the composition 
of an effective board of directors. To facilitate optimal decision making by the board of 
directors, there is evidence for and against the importance of a balance of executive and 
independent non-executive directors on the board.2 This study contributes new evidence on the 
optimality of a balance of executive and independent directors by focusing on settings where 
boards are actively making acquisition decisions.  
Second, there is a perception among shareholder advocates, some policy-makers, and 
researchers that busy directors, sitting on multiple boards, are not effective board members 
(e.g., Core et al. 1999; Fich and Shivdasani 2006). The concern is that these busy directors 
have insufficient time to devote to the board’s business and are exposed to multiple conflicts of 
interest. Consistent with this concern, Fich and Shivadasnasi (2006) find that firms with a 
majority of directors sitting on three or more boards have relatively lower market to book 
equity and also a lower sensitivity between the firm’s financial performance and the turnover 
of the CEO. However, an alternative argument is that the networks and experience gained from 
multiple directorships increases a director’s ability to contribute to the board decision-making 
processes (e.g., Ferris et al. 2003; Harris and Shimizu 2004). Byrd and Hickman (1992) and 
Perry and Peyer (2005) provide evidence that busy directors are more effective as monitors but 
only up to a threshold beyond which effectiveness declines with the addition of more 
directorships. Our tests provide new evidence from the acquisition setting in which busy 
independent directors are actively engaged in their board duties. We find that being a busy 
independent director is not associated with impaired effort to the board duties unless the firm 
has a free cash flows problem (Jensen 1986). However, being a busy executive who is the 
Chairman is associated with lower performance outcomes after acquisitions. 
Third, most of the prior literature is based on the US setting. Given the increasing 
globalization of financing, business, and GAAP accounting regulation, the generalizability of 
the existing literature on busy directors to other settings with different institutional features but 
increasingly integrated flows of business services is of interest to national and international 
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 For example, Weisbach (1988); Mayers and Shivdasani (1997); Scherrer (2003); Balatbat et. al., (2004); Desai 
et. al., (2005); and Lim et. al., (2007). 
financial market participants. The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that the 
independence of directors, and whether directors sit on multiple boards, has implications for 
the effectiveness of directors in their role as monitors and decision-makers.  
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 outlines the sample and experimental design. Section 4 
reports the primary results; while the additional tests’ results are contained in Section 5. 
Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion of the limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
2.0 Theory and Hypothesis Development 
The agency relationship between managers and shareholders provides opportunities for 
managers to act in their own interests rather than in the interests of shareholders and the firm as 
a whole (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This agency problem arises as a consequence of the 
separation of ownership and control of the firm and moral hazard. Complete contracting for 
future contingencies is not possible because the complete set of future states and their 
probabilities cannot be foreseen. Instead, professional managers are hired, under incentive 
compensation contracts, to sit on the governing board of directors, and this body is charged 
with the business management responsibility under common law, legislation, and the firm’s 
constitution.3 
2.1  Acquisition Decisions by the Board of Directors 
Acquisition decisions by the board of directors are among the most significant and 
observable investment decisions of the board. These investment decisions provide a setting to 
study the implications of corporate governance mechanisms for mitigating agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders.  
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 Compensation contracts are imperfect, and with the delegated (from shareholders) management rights at their 
disposal, managers have opportunities to transfer wealth (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Opportunistic wealth 
transfers may be pecuniary in the form of salary or managerial perquisites (e.g., luxury cars and travel perks); or 
non-pecuniary relating to decisions and actions that enhance the managers’ status, prestige or power but are not in 
the interest of the firm as a whole. For example, managers can expropriate investors’ funds by entrenching 
themselves in their position even if they are no longer competent or qualified to run the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 
1989). 
The evidence from studies of the acquisition decisions by the bidding firms suggests 
that bidders fail to realize positive returns on average (e.g., Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992). 
Existing studies investigate economic and governance factors underlying the poor bidder 
outcomes from acquisitions. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) examine the implications of 
anti-takeover provisions. They construct an anti-takeover “G-index” from the 24 items in the 
IRRC publications and find weak shareholder rights is associated with underperformance of 
the bidder.4 Ensuing studies study the acquisition implications of sub-sets of this index 
(Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2004; Sokolyk, 2006), and the index combined with additional 
corporate governance factors including board composition, CEO equity stock and option 
incentives, and institutional ownership (Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007). These latter studies 
suggest the G-index is not related to better acquisition decisions by the board. The evidence 
suggests that better acquisition decisions are associated with some individual items in the index 
as well as some governance factors.5 What the evidence also suggests is that the index 
approach to explaining acquisition decisions by boards is flawed because the index items 
individually relate differently to the acquisitions in terms of the theoretical links, the signs of 
the relations, and the significance of each factor (Sokolyk, 2006).  
In this paper, we focus on the implications for the board’s acquisitions decisions of the 
board independence, and director busyness which have yet to be addressed in the literature, and 
controlling for other factors. We follow the prior literature by measuring the board’s 
performance in relation to acquisition decisions using two indicators: the bidder’s post-
acquisition stock relative to the bidder’s pre acquisition stock price, and this latter measure 
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 The Responsibility Research Center, Inc (IRRC) is a commercial source for data on corporate governance, 
proxy voting, and corporate responsibility. 
5
 For example, Sokolyk (2006) finds that staggered boards, fair price provisions, and limitations on directors’ 
liability and indemnification deter takeovers; while golden parachutes, compensation plans, and limitations to act 
by written consent and to call a special meeting are associated with a higher probability of takeovers. Masulis et al 
(2007) find that acquirers with more anti-takeover provisions experience lower abnormal stock returns to their 
takeover announcements. Masulis et al interpret this result as the investors’ negative response to the anti-takeover 
shield which increases the probability that managers are destroying value by engaging in empire building.  
relative to the level of the acquisition premium.6 Relatively higher post-acquisition stock price 
performance of the bidder is an indicator of good decision making by the board in relation to 
acquisitions. 
A board may decide to pay a high premium for an acquisition if it believes that the 
investment can provide a good return in the long run. A high premium accompanied by 
relatively high post-acquisition stock performance is indicative of a successful board decision. 
A high acquisition premium coupled with relatively low post-acquisition performance suggests 
that the premium is more likely to include an over-payment portion and therefore reflects a less 
successful board decision.  
2.2 Conflicted Acquisitions 
We also consider the implications of board independence and busy directors for the 
frequency of conflicted acquisitions—thereby, providing a direct test of the agency conflict 
implications of board independence and director busyness.  
A conflicted acquisition is an acquisition involving actual or perceived conflicts of 
interest between two or more key stakeholders. Conflicts of interest can arise between the 
board of directors and the shareholders within the bidder and/or the target firm. Examples of 
this type of perceived conflict include the following: acquisitions where the chairperson sits on 
both the bidder and target firms’ boards. For example, during the acquisition of Taipan 
Resources NL by St Barbara Mines Ltd, Stephen Miller is an executive chairperson for both 
the bidder and the target firm (Klinger 2000). Another example is acquisitions where directors 
are incentivised to focus predominately on their firm’s short-term performance. For example, 
Southcorp Holdings promised to advance Cuppa Cup Vineyard's chief executive to a senior 
management role if it was successful in its $42 million friendly takeover bid (Salmons 1999). 
This is a type of conflict where the director personally stands to benefit from the acquisition. 
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 For example, Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) employ post-acquisition stock returns to measure the gains to 
bidding firms from mergers. 
The problem arising in relation to conflicted acquisitions is that an acquisition might be 
undertaken even though the deal is not in the best interests of the company as a whole. 
Conflicts of interest in relation to acquisitions can also arise where institutional 
investors own stock in both the bidder and the target firms. Institutional investors are less 
likely to lose if they hold stocks in both firms because a poor deal for one side of the 
Bidder/Target transaction is offset by the gains to the other side of the deal. Consistent with 
this scenario, Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) find that institutional shareholders of acquiring 
companies on average do not lose money because the institutional investors hold substantial 
stakes in the targets and make up for the losses from the acquirers with the gains from the 
targets. Pursuant to the institutional investor incentives, they find in mergers with negative 
acquirer announcement returns, that these institutional cross-owners are significantly more 
likely to vote for the merger. Thus, a conflict of interest exists where institutional investors 
hold both Bidder and Target shares (cross-owners) because these investors do not have 
incentives to vote down acquisitions that destroy value. 
2.3  Monitoring Role of Independent Directors 
The board is the ultimate legal authority with respect to decision-making in the firm. 
Common law and statute relating to the business management rule confers wide powers on the 
board of directors to make and implement strategy including the oversight of investment, 
operating, and financial decisions, and monitoring of the executive management.  
Security market regulators assume that boards dominated by independent outside 
directors provide effective monitoring. However, researchers have not been able to document a 
systematic relation between board independence and firm performance (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2003).7 Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2008) argue that the key underlying 
                                                 
7 Some studies provide evidence consistent with this assumption (Weisbach 1988; Mayers and Shivdasani 1997; 
Scherrer 2003; Balatbat et al. 2004; Desai et al. 2005; Lim et al. 2007). For example, Mayers and Shivdasani 
(1997) find evidence suggesting independent boards are associated with relatively better long-term stock 
performance and the channel for this outcome is oversight over cost structure and investment decisions. Weisbach 
(1988) finds that boards dominated by independent directors are more likely to remove poorly performing CEOs.  
determinant of board structure is the power of management relative to the board and to outside 
stakeholders.8 According to this view, we would expect to observe independent boards and 
more effective monitoring of (the executive) management when the firm has a constitution and 
corporate governance structure which approaches the firm’s optimal design. 
A direct test of monitoring effectiveness is to focus on observable decisions of the 
board relating to acquisitions and relate the acquisition decision outcomes to board 
independence. Some studies suggest an independent board can reduce the probability of a firm 
engaging in value destroying acquisitions (e.g., Byrd and Hickman 1992).9 Other studies find 
no role for board independence in the US setting: for example, Subrahmanyam, Rangan and 
Rosenstein (1997) in the banking industry and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2008) for acquirers 
included in the IRRC database.10  
In this study we re-examine the monitoring effectiveness of board independence in the 
context of the acquiring board’s acquisition decision and the extent of conflicts of interest 
associated with the acquisition which has not previously been studied. We make the following 
prediction based on the theory that suggests independent boards discipline the board’s decision 
making processes to achieve superior outcomes.  
H1: Independent boards are associated with superior acquisition decision outcomes and 
fewer acquisitions involving conflicts of interest.  
2.4 Busy Independent Directors  
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 For example, Shivdasani and Yemack (1999) find that boards with CEOs controlling the nominating process for 
directors have fewer independent directors, and tend to have the appointed independent directors often have 
financial links to the CEO or to the firm.  
9
 Consistent with this evidence, other studies find that firms with staggered boards, which are arguably not 
independent, make acquisition decisions with poorer outcomes (e.g., Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). Staggered 
boards do not have annual elections for directors. Instead, directors are elected for multiple years with only a 
proportion of the directors up for election in a given year. Staggered boards are thought to entrench management 
and decrease firm value. Consistent with this view, Guo, Kruse and Nohel (2008) find a positive investor response 
when activist shareholders lobby for destaggering of the board.  
10 They expect to observe a positive association between board independence and 5 day (-2, +2) cumulative 
abnormal returns around the acquirer’s acquisition announcement, reflecting investors response to good news, but 
find no relation. 
Whilst independent directors play a role in monitoring the board, the effectiveness of 
their role can be impaired when serving on multiple boards. A reduction in oversight may 
increase inter and intra-board conflicts and induce sub-optimal board decisions (Core et. al.,, 
1999; Shivdasani and Yermack 1999; Loderer and Peyer 2002; Fich and Shivdasani 2006).  
In support of the busyness hypothesis, a number of studies suggest that directors sitting 
on multiple boards do not function well as monitors (see Fich and Shivdasani 2006). Further, 
additional directorships increase the level of conflicts between insider and outsider directors. 
For instance, Core et. al., (1999) find that CEO compensation is higher and firm value is lower 
when outside directors are older and serve on more than three other boards. Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) find a negative stock price reaction when appointees are busy directors.  
However busy directors may also reflect the demand for individuals with superior 
skills, experience, and networks (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Booth and Deli, 1996). A number of 
studies from different settings suggest that busy directors can add value as monitors, although 
some of these results have been challenged on methodological grounds. For example, Fich and 
Shivadasni (2003) revisit the busy director link to performance and report that busy directors 
may not always be effective in relation to the endgame of superior performance.11  
We study the implications of busy directors directly by focusing on the board’s 
acquisition decisions. Initially, we focus on busy independent directors and later expand our 
tests to consider executive directors due to the endogenous nature of the firm’s governance 
structure. Taking into account the doubt expressed by some researchers about the extent that 
independent directors really are independent (e.g., see Brown, 2007), and given the widespread 
incidence of staggered boards and other devices for nominating directors, and the difficulties 
for busy directors to attend board meetings and otherwise fulfil their obligations, we predict 
                                                 
11 For example, Kaplan and Reishus (1990), Gilson (1990), Shivdasani (1993), Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999), 
and Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003). 
that busy directors are associated with inferior board decisions relating to acquisitions. This 
paper therefore hypothesizes the following:  
 
H2: Busy independent directors (sitting on multiple boards) are associated with inferior 
acquisition decision outcomes and more acquisitions involving conflicts of interest.  
 
We also predict that the impact of busy directors is magnified when firms have high 
free cash flows (FCFs). FCFs are cash flows in excess of what is required to fund all projects 
that have positive net present values. Jensen argues that directors are more likely to squander 
resources on negative net present value projects when a firm has substantial FCFs and poor 
investment opportunities. Lang et. al., (1991) suggest that bidder returns are the lowest among 
firms with low Tobin’s Qs and high FCF. Morck et. al., (1990) find that bidder returns tend to 
be the lowest when bidders diversify or when bidders buy rapidly growing firms. A possible 
consequence of monitoring inefficiencies when directors are too busy is the depletion of the 
FCFs on value destroying acquisitions (Jensen 1986). 
We therefore predict that high free cash flows magnifies the dysfunctional monitoring 
of busy directors leading to sub-optimal acquisition and agency cost outcomes. 
H3: Busy independent directors (sitting on multiple boards) are associated with inferior 
acquisition decision outcomes and more acquisitions involving conflicts of interest for firms 
with higher free cash flows.  
 
3.0 Empirical Analysis 
The sample includes all successful acquisitions during the period 1997 to 2007, where 
both bidder’s and target’s firms are listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The 
original sample comprises 253 observations. Investment trusts, managed funds, and banks are 
removed from the sample due to differences in governance and reporting requirements. Further 
deletions are made for firms with missing data and those reporting in foreign currencies. The 
final sample comprises 218 firm-year observations. Table 1 shows the sample selection 
process. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
The corporate governance data is derived from the UTS Accenture Who Governs 
Australia database. This latter database contains detailed information on each firm's executive 
structure, board of directors, compensation practices, executive and director shareholdings, 
external auditor details, and shareholder details on the top 500 companies and 800 randomly 
selected smaller companies for the period 2001 to 2007. The corporate governance data from 
1997 to 2000 is hand collected from the firms’ annual financial statement on Connect 4. The 
individual firm-level stock prices and year-end financial statement data is obtained from the 
Aspect Huntley database.   
 
3.1 Empirical Models 
 
3.1.1 Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the proportion of independent directors to total directors on 
the board is related to superior acquisition decisions by the board of directors and fewer 
conflicts of interest relating to acquisitions. We estimate equation (1) to test Hypothesis 1 using 
different estimators for the three dependent variables according to the distribution of the data as 
elaborated below. 
BoardPerfit = a0it + a1IndBoardit + a2Controlsit + εit    (1) 
 
Non-executive status is used to proxy for the independence of the directors (IndBoard). 
Independent board is calculated as the number of independent directors over the total number 
of directors on board using data from the Who Governs Australia database, as follows. 
 Three dependent variables are employed to measure the board performance in relation 
to the acquisition decision (BoardPerfit).  
1. Post-acquisition stock price performance (PostPerfit+1,t+2,t+3/) is computed as the 
bidding firm's post acquisition share price 1, 2 or 3 years after the acquisition divided by the 
bidding firm’s stock price one month prior to the acquisition ((1y, 2y, 3y ahead stock price of 
the bidder)/one month prior stock price of the Bidder).  
 
 
Equation (1) for the Post-acquisition stock price performance continuous variable is 
estimated using ordinary least squared estimators. 
2. Acquisition Performance Relative to the Acquisition Premium 
(PostPerfit+1,t+2,t+3/Premiumit): the post-acquisition stock price performance (PostPerfit+1,t+2,t+3/) 
of the Bidder is measured as above in point one. The acquisition premium (Premiumit) is 
measured as the acquisition purchase price paid by the Bidder divided by the stock price of the 
target firm 20 days before the acquisition. These data items are obtained from Aspect Huntley. 
 
 
Equation (1) for the Acquisition Performance Relative to the Acquisition Premium 
continuous variable is estimated using ordinary least squared estimators. 
 
3. Conflicts of Interest Associated with the Acquisition (Conflictedit):  is a count of 
the acquisitions undertaken by the bidding firm that involve perceived conflicts of interest. 
Three types of conflicts of interest are considered in constructing the Conflicted variable 
including institutional conflicts, director conflicts and major stakeholder conflicts.  
In relation to the institutional conflicts, investors are less likely to lose if they hold 
stocks in both the Bidder and the Target firms. More specifically, institutional investors 
holding both bidder and target shares are cross-owners who are more likely to vote for a 
merger even if there are negative announcement returns to the bidding firm (Ostrovsky and 
Matvos, 2006). Consequently, for each acquisition, we count the number of institutional cross-
owners that own both bidder and target shares as a measure of institutional conflict.  
To compute directors conflicts and major stakeholder conflict variables, keywords 
relating to the types of conflicts discussed in Section 2.2.2 are used to search the financial 
media including The Australian Financial Review and Factiva.com, for the period 3-months 
prior to and 3-months after the acquisition date. The keywords used for the search include: 
“conflicts”; “conflicts of interest”; “low ball offer”; “financial incentives”; “breached directors’ 
duties”; and “continuous disclosure”. For each acquisition, a variable is coded one for the 
existence of a report on a perceived or actual conflict and zero otherwise. Equation (1) for the 
Conflicts of Interest Associated with the Acquisition count variable is estimated using a Poisson 
estimator. The conflicted acquisition measure of board effectiveness is a new measure that has 
not been employed before to examine board effectiveness in relation to acquisitions. 
 
3.1.2 Tests of Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that busy independent directors are associated with inferior board 
decision-making performance relating to acquisitions and more acquisitions involving conflicts 
of interest. Equation (2) is estimated to test Hypothesis 2.  
BoardPerfit = β0it + β1IndBoardit + β2BusyIndit + β3Controlsit + µit  (2) 
 
Using the UTS Accenture Who Governs Australia database, the proportion of busy 
independent directors on the board is measured as the number of the independent directors on 
the board of directors holding more than three directorships divided by the total directors on 




3.1.3 Tests of Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that higher free cash flows magnify the monitoring inefficiencies 
associated with busy independent directors. Equation (3) is estimated to test Hypothesis 3.  
 
BoardPerfit = γ0it + γ1IndBoardit + γ2BusyIndit + γ3FCFit + γ4(BusyIndit*FCFit) + 
γ5Controlsit + ηit          (3) 
 
Free cash flow measures the free cash flows of the bidding firm prior to the acquisition 
scaled by the implied market value of the acquisition (data from Aspect Huntley).  
Free Cash Flow is equal to Net income + Amortisation and depreciation – Change in 
working capital – Capital expenditures 
 
3.2 Control Variables 
The following variables, using data from the Aspect Huntley database, control for 
alternative plausible explanations for board performance and conflicted acquisitions.  
 OfferCashit The OfferCash variables is coded one for a cash funded acquisition and 
zero otherwise  
OfferScripit Firms can issue shares to fund the acquisitions. However this may lower 
the existing shareholder value due to the dilution of the existing 
shareholder wealth (Myers and Majluf, 1984). OfferScrip is a binary 
variable represent by one if the acquisition is scrip funded and zero 
otherwise 
DealVolit Consistent with Harris and Shimizu (2004) and Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999), deal volume proxies for the business conditions 
surrounding the acquisition. The deal volume is measured as the total 
acquisition activity.  
DealSizeit Consistent with Harris and Shimizu (2004), deal size proxies for size 
related factors that are associated with the board decisions (e.g., 
economic impact, antitrust concerns, level of market scrutiny, tax 
implications, number of employees to be integrated in the acquisition). 
Deal size is measured as the log transformation of the total dollar value 
of the acquisition.  
RelSizeit Asquith et. al., (1983) find that bidder returns tend to distribute 
according to the relative size between the bidder and target firms. That 
is, targets that are relatively smaller in size are associated with smaller 
abnormal returns to the acquiring firm. Relsize is the natural log of the 
target total assets divided by the bidder total assets in the year 
immediately preceding the acquisition announcement.  
BidderDebtit Bruner (1988) suggests that the bidding firm’s capital structure 
influences the choice of target firms, the market value of the acquisition, 
and the returns accruing to the bidder. Consistent with Harris and 
Shimizu (2004) the bidder’s leverage is measured as the bidder’s debt-
to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement.  
PriorBidder-
Perfit 
Morck et al. (1989) find that firms with 
relatively superior financial performance tend to be 
successful acquirers. Prior bidder performance is measured as the acquirer’s 
average return on assets for the 3-years prior to the acquisition 
announcement.  
BidderSizeit Castaldi and Wortman (1984) suggest that small companies tend to “under-utilize” their boards for 
decision-making and strategic direction.
 We therefore control for the variance in 
board performance attributable to differences in firm size using the 
natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year 
immediately prior to the acquisition announcement.  
Top20_Institit Institutional ownership can influence board independence. Consistent 
with prior studies (Bethel and Liebeskind 1993; Daily 1996; Harris and 
Shimizu 2004), the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors 
proxies for the level of institutional ownership in the bidding firm. 
Institutional ownership data is obtained from the financial report prior to 
the acquisition announcement date.  
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. Table 2 suggests that the 
sample consists of a wide range of acquisitions in terms of the post share price performance, 
and board composition. For instance, the premium ranges from – 24.7 to 81.1 percent while 
firm post-acquisition performance (3 years) ranges from -97.2 to 182.8 percent. Panel B of 
Table 2 shows that 17.9 percent of the sample has a busy CEO on the board, while 57.3 percent 
have a busy chairperson on the board. Only 2.3 percent of the sample firms have both a busy 
CEO and a busy chairperson on the board.  
 
< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE > 
 
Table 3 reports the sample composition for the pooled sample. The top five industries 
in the sample are materials, consumer services, real estate, diversified financials, and food 
beverage & tobacco.12 Together these five industries make up 41.74% of the sample. On 
average, each industry represents 4.76% of the sample. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 3 HERE > 
 
Table 4 reports the correlations among the variables. The Pearson correlations are 
shown above the diagonal, and the Spearman’s rhos are shown below the diagonal.  Nearly all 
the variables are significantly correlated with each of the remaining variables. In particular, the 
post-acquisition performance measures are positively correlated with each other. As expected, 
FCF is positively correlated with both bidder size and independent busy directors. 
Accordingly, it is important to control for firm size effects in the regressions.  
< INSERT TABLE 4 HERE > 
The data is screened for outliers using graphical methods and regression diagnostics 
and outliers greater than two standard deviations from the mean are deleted. 
3.4 Primary Results - Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the proportion of independent directors (IndBoard) is 
positively associated with the success of the board’s decision-making performance in relation 
to acquisitions. Table 5 (equation 1) reports the regression results for Hypothesis 1. 
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Panel A of Table 5 indicates that the coefficient for IndBoard is positive and 
significantly associated with the 3-years post-acquisition performance relative to the 
acquisition premium (PostPerfit+1,t+2,t+3/Premiumit). The coefficients of IndBoard are positive 
but not significant for 1 and 2 years post-acquisition performance relative to the premium 
(PostPerfit+1,t+2,t+3/Premiumit). Panel B shows that IndBoard is not significantly associated with 
conflicted acquisitions. Panel C indicates that the coefficient for IndBoard is positive and 
significantly associated with the post-acquisition relative share price performance ((1y, 2y, 3y 
ahead stock price of the bidder)/one month prior stock price of the Bidder). Overall, these 
primary results provide support for Hypothesis 1 suggesting that the proportion of independent 
directors to total directors on the board is positively related to the board’s decision-making 
performance in relation to acquisitions, especially for the post-acquisition relative share price 
performance.  
 
3.5 Primary Results - Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative association between the busyness of independent 
directors (BusyInd) and the success of the board’s decision-making performance in relation to 
the acquisition. Table 5 (equation 2) reports the regression results for Hypothesis 2.  
The coefficients of IndBoard are not significant for the post-acquisition performance 
relative to the premium and the conflicted acquisitions dependent variables. However, the 
coefficients of IndBoard are significant and positively associated with the post-acquisition 
relative share price performance ((1y, 2y, 3y ahead stock price of the bidder)/one month prior 
stock price of the Bidder). Overall, these results for IndBoard are consistent with the equation 
1 results.  
Panel A and C of Table 5 show that the coefficient for BusyInd is positively associated 
with both the post-acquisition performance relative to premium and the post-acquisition 
relative share price performance. In contrast, Panel B shows that the coefficient for BusyInd is 
negative but is not significantly associated with conflicted acquisitions. Overall, these results 
contradict Hypothesis 2. These results provide support for the null of Hypothesis 2, the 
effective monitoring hypothesis, suggesting that the busyness of independent directors (sitting 
on multiple boards) is positively related to the success of the board’s decision-making 
performance in relation to acquisitions. 
 
3.6 Primary Results - Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the negative association between the busyness of 
independent directors (sitting on multiple boards) and success of the board’s decision-making 
performance in relation to acquisitions is worse for firms with higher free cash flows. Table 5 
(equation 3) reports the regression results for Hypothesis 3.  
Table 5 shows that the results for IndBoard are consistent with the results reported for 
equations 1 and 2, namely the coefficients for IndBoard are not significant for post-acquisition 
performance relative to the premium and the conflicted acquisition dependent variables. 
However, the coefficients for IndBoard are significant and positively associated with the post-
acquisition relative share price performance ((1y, 2y, 3y ahead stock price of the bidder)/one 
month prior stock price of the Bidder). The results for BusyInd are also consistent with 
equation 2, namely the coefficients of BusyInd are positive and significantly associated with 
the post-acquisition performance relative to the premium and the post-acquisition relative share 
price performance.  
Panel A and C of Table 5 show that the FCF coefficients are positive and significantly 
associated with the post-acquisition performance relative to the premium and the post-
acquisition share price performance (3-years post-acquisition); while Panel B indicates FCF is 
not significantly associated with conflicted acquisitions.  
Table 5 shows that the incremental effect of the interaction variable (BusyInd*FCF) is a 
negative and significant association with both the post-acquisition performance relative to the 
premium and the post-acquisition relative share price performance. These findings are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3 suggesting that the busyness of independent directors on the 
board is negatively related to the board’s decision-making performance for firms with higher 
free cash flows. Hence, as predicted in Hypothesis 3, the busyness of the independent directors 
matters most when firms have higher free cash flows and are at risk of empire building by 
executive management.  
In summary, the results of the hypothesis tests are as follows. The evidence is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. After controlling for a large range of other factors, the tests 
confirm the predicted positive relation between the board’s performance in relation to 
acquisition decisions and the independence of the board. This evidence complements the prior 
literature providing a direct test of the monitoring effectiveness of the board by focusing on an 
observable acquisition decision and its outcome. The results are not consistent with Hypothesis 
2 which predicts a negative relation between the busyness of directors and the success of the 
board’s decision making. Instead the results suggest that busy directors are associated with 
more successful board performance in relation to acquisition decisions. The results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3 for which we predict and find that as the bidding firm’s free cash 
flows increase, less busy directors are associated with more successful board performance in 
relation to acquisition decisions.  
 
3.7 Additional Tests 
We evaluate the robustness of the hypothesis test results to alternative explanations as 
follows.  
 3.7.1 Decomposition of the Board of Directors 
One limitation of the primary tests is that the director classification into independent or 
non-independent does not differentiate between busy CEO, Chairperson, and Non-independent 
(executive) directors. There are differences in the role and level of commitment of the different 
types of directors. The CEO and non-independent directors are full-time inside directors 
whereas chairpersons and independent directors are usually part-time external directors. To 
obtain further insights, the board of directors are decomposed into different categories: 
BusyCEO, Chairperson, Non-independent, and Independent directors. Table 6 reports the 
regression results for hypothesis tests conducted for the decomposed board of directors. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 6 HERE > 
 
Panel C of Table 6 shows that BusyInd is positive and significantly associated with the 
firm’s post-acquisition share price performance. Both the coefficient and t-statistic are larger 
for the 3-years post-acquisition performance compared to the 1 and 2 years post-acquisition 
performance. These results imply that firms with a higher proportion of busy independent 
directors will experience better post-acquisition relative performance compared to firms with a 
lower proportion of busy independent directors. Consistent with the primary results, these 
results support the effective monitoring hypothesis (the null hypothesis to Hypothesis 2) 
suggesting that busy independent directors can be better decisions makers compared to non-
busy independent directors.  
Panel B of Table 6 shows the coefficient for BusyChair is positive and significantly 
associated with the conflicted acquisitions dependent variable. Further, Panel C shows the 
coefficient for BusyChair is consistently negative and significantly associated with the firm’s 
post-acquisition relative share price performance. These results imply that firms with busy 
chairpersons are likely to experience more conflicted acquisitions and have a lower post-
acquisition performance compared to firms without busy chairpersons. Thus, these results for 
the busy Chairperson are consistent with the Hypothesis 2 prediction that busy directors are 
ineffective but in the context when the director is the Chairperson of the board of directors.  
Results for the FCF variable and the free cash flow interaction term (BusyInd*FCF) are 
consistent with the primary results. The interaction variable (BusyInd*FCF) is negative and 
significantly associated with both the post-acquisition performance relative to the acquisition 
premium and the firm’s post-acquisition relative share price performance. These results are 
consistent with the Hypothesis 3 prediction that the busyness of independent directors is 
negatively related to the board’s decision-making performance for firms with higher free cash 
flows. 
Overall, the results for BusyInd provide support for the effective monitoring hypothesis, 
which is the null for Hypothesis 2, suggesting that busy independent directors can be better 
decisions makers compared to non-busy independent directors. The results for BusyChair are 
consistent with Hypothesis 2 suggesting that the busyness of independent directors is 
negatively related to the board’s decision-making performance in relation to acquisitions. The 
results suggest that the relevant issue is not “Whether or not directors are busy?” but “Who is 
busy?” 
 
3.7.2 Weighting the Outside Directorships 
The primary and the decomposition models assume that directors with more than three 
outside directorships are busy. A limitation of this assumption is that it does not take into 
account the differences in the types of outside directorships held by the directors. For instance, 
directors who hold three full-time directorships require more time compared to directors who 
hold three part-time directorships. We therefore rerun the tests weighting the outside 
directorships depending on the types of directorships held. Consistent with the prior literature 
(Harris and Shimizu 2004; Kiel and Nicholson 2006), we weight the CEO/Executive 
directorships by four; the Chairpersons’ directorships by two; and the miscellaneous roles as 
one-half of the independent directorships. Table 7 reports the regression results for the 
weighted tests. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 7 HERE > 
 
Panel A and C of Table 7 show that the coefficient for BusyInd is consistently positive 
and significantly associated with the firm’s post-acquisition performance relative to the 
premium and the firm’s post-acquisition relative share price performance, consistent with the 
decomposition model results above. Once again, these results are in contrast to the Hypothesis 
2 prediction, and instead suggest that busy independent directors can be better decisions 
makers compared to non-busy independent directors. In addition, Panel B shows that the 
coefficient for BusyChair is positive and significantly associated with conflicted acquisitions, 
and negatively associated with the firm’s post-acquisition share price performance. Thus, these 
results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 suggesting that busy chairpersons are associated with 
less effective acquisition decisions compared to non-busy chairpersons. 
Panel A and C of Table 7 show that the coefficient for BusyNonInd (busy non-
independent directors) is positive and significantly associated with both the post-acquisition 
performance relative to acquisition premium and post-acquisition relative share performance 
for 2 years post-acquisition. However, the coefficient for BusyNonInd is negative and 
insignificant for the 3 years post-acquisition. These results suggest that firms with a higher 
proportion of BusyNonInd are more likely to perform well in the short-term post acquisition.  
Results for FCF and the interaction variable (BusyInd*FCF) are consistent with both 
the primary and decomposition models. Namely, the interaction variable is negative and 
significantly associated with both the post-acquisition performance relative to premium and 
post-acquisition share price performance, consistent with Hypothesis 3, suggesting that the 
busyness of independent directors is negatively related to the board’s decision-making 
performance for firms with higher free cash flows.   
Overall, the results from the weighted models are consistent with both the primary and 
the decomposition models. These additional results show that firms with higher BusyInd are 
likely to perform better post acquisition and firms with a BusyChair are more likely to 
experience conflicted acquisitions and have lower post-acquisition performance. Consequently, 
the question of interest is not only “Who is busy?” but also “What are they busy doing?” 
 
3.7.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Performance  
The above tests measure post-acquisition share price performance as the normal returns 
on the share price. This simple model is an actual total returns rather than an unexpected 
returns measure which is unadjusted for the market return. We test the sensitivity of the results 
using cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as the dependent variable. Table 13 reports the 
results for the CARs regressions.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 8 HERE> 
 
Panel A of Table 8 tabulates the results for the short-term CARs (2 day and 3 day 
windows) and Panel B provides the results for the long-term CARs (1, 2 and 3 year windows). 
Panel A shows no significant association between any of the variables of interest with the 
short-term CARs. However in Panel B, the long window, one-year ahead CAR results suggest 
a positive and significant estimated coefficient for INDBOARD, and incremental negative and 
significant coefficients for both the BusyChair and the BusyNonInd variables. Generally, these 
results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 and the previous reported results, with the additional 
result that fewer busy executive directors on the board is associated with relatively higher 
cumulative returns. Overall, these additional results suggest that bidding firms with less 
independent boards, and with busy chairpersons and busy executive directors, experience lower 
cumulative return performance for the first year after the acquisition.   
 3.7.4 Additional Robustness Tests 
In unreported tests, we also evaluate the sensitivity of the results to additional effects 
including amortization of acquired goodwill, earnings and earnings changes, auditor quality, 
the price to book ratio, and including conflicted acquisitions as a control variable in the board 
performance tests. Two prior studies suggest that the bidder’s goodwill amortisation can be a 
factor that drives the post-acquisition share price (Shad 1973; Norris and Ayres 2000). 
However, we find the results unchanged. We also find the results unchanged when we include 
earnings and changes in earnings in the equations (see Donnelly and Walker 1995; Kasznik and 
McNichols 2002). In relation to auditor quality, the auditor is also a mechanism to constrain 
the effectiveness of dysfunctional behaviours of management. Smith and Watts (1992) find that 
the cost of monitoring managers is positively related to firm growth opportunities which we 
proxy using price to book. We find the primary results are robust to these additional control 
variables and to the inclusion of the conflicted acquisition variable as an additional control for 
performance.  
We also evaluate the sensitivity of the findings for Hypothesis 3 by interacting busy 
non-independent directors and FCF (BusyNonInd*FCF) instead of busy independent directors 
and FCF (BusyInd*FCF). Unreported results show BusyNonInd*FCF is positive but not 
significantly associated with post-acquisition performance relative to the premium and post-
acquisition share performance, further BusyNonInd*FCF is negative but not significantly 
associated with conflict acquisitions. These additional results might reflect a lack of power or 
alternately that Hypothesis 3 is descriptive only for busy independent directors on bidding firm 
boards that have higher free cash flows, and does not extend to busy executive directors. 
We evaluate the sensitivity of the findings with respect to various alternative scaling 
variables such as total assets. Unreported table shows that the results are generally consistent 
with the primary results. In addition, board composition variables can collectively drive the 
result. To control for this effect we estimate reduced form regressions that test the board 
composition variables separately. These results are consistent with the primary findings. We 
also estimate univariate Mann-Whitney Equality of Mean Tests to compare firm performance 
separately for the groups – busy and non-busy directors. Again, the overall results are 
consistent with the primary and additional results reported in the prior sections.  
 
4.0 Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper addresses the question of whether independent directors are effective 
monitors during acquisitions and whether this effectiveness is impaired when the independent 
directors serve on multiple boards. This study has expanded on current knowledge by 
providing preliminary evidence on the relation between busy directors and three indicators of 
the board’s performance in making optimal acquisition decisions: the acquisition premium 
benchmarked against post-acquisition performance, perceived conflicts of interest associated 
with the acquisition (conflicted acquisitions), and the post-acquisition stock performance. The 
paper also decomposes the board of directors into its constituent parts and examines whether 
less effective board decisions are observed for CEOs, Chairpersons and Executive directors.  
The motivation for this research is threefold: First, organisations such as the ASA, the 
Council of Institutional Investor in the US, and the Financial Reporting Council in the UK call 
for limits on the number of directorships held by individual directors. They argue that there is a 
link between companies with difficulties and the workloads of their boards. Despite the strong 
view of shareholder advocates and policy-makers that multiple directorships impair the 
effectiveness of directors, there is limited empirical evidence that exists to support this 
assumption. The second motivation relates to the focus in the prior literature on the association 
between the busyness of directors and firm performance. The present paper extends the prior 
literature by examining the implications of busy directors in an acquisition context. The third 
motivation relates to the focus of prior literature, which is mainly in the US setting. Given the 
increasing globalization of financing, business, and GAAP accounting regulation, the 
generalizability of the existing literature on busy directors to other settings with different 
institutional features but increasingly integrated flows of business services is of interest to 
national and international financial market participants.   
The results based on an Australian sample of 218 firm observations suggest that busy 
independent directors on the bidding firm’s board are associated with more effective 
acquisition decisions by the board but not when the bidding firm has higher free cash flows, a 
finding which is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) empire building theory. The results also 
suggest that busy executive (non-independent) directors on the bidding firm’s board have no 
negative implications for the effectiveness of acquisition decisions unless the director is a busy 
chairperson or busy CEO both of whom are associated with less effective acquisition decisions.  
There is an opportunity for further work to obtain more precise measures and a greater 
understanding of when independent directors are truly independent. It would also be beneficial 
to investigate whether the level of remuneration influences the impairment of busy directors, 
especially for the chairperson. Finally, it would be constructive to investigate whether the level 
of experience and education impacts the above association.  
In conclusion, this study provides a plausible explanation for why both negative and 
positive relations exist between busy directors and the board’s decision performance. The 
results suggest that the relevant question is not “Whether or not directors are busy?”, but more 
relevant is the question “Who is busy?” and “What are they busy doing?” 
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Original Sample 8 10 19 36 32 33 21 15 29 27 23 253 253 253 253
Reason for deletion:
Investment trusts and managed funds - - 6 7 3 2 1 2 - 1 - 22 22 22 22
Banks - - - 2 - 1 - - - - 1 4 4 4 4
Missing data - Premium - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - 2 - - -
Missing data - Post 1y - - 2 1 1 1 1 - - 1 1 - 8 - -
Missing data - Post 2y - 1 1 4 5 3 - 1 5 2 4 - - 26 -
Missing data - Post 3y 1 1 6 6 11 8 4 5 9 8 8 - - - 67
Outliers - - - - - - - - - - - 7 1 8 3





Panel A: Sample Statistics
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness
POST_1Y_PREMIUM 0.8658 0.8313 1.8061 0.0852 0.3564 0.3790
POST_2Y_PREMIUM 0.8070 0.8000 1.8534 0.0181 0.4067 0.0608
POST_3Y_PREMIUM 0.9388 0.9034 2.5354 0.0236 0.5105 0.4974
POST_1YR 1.0465 1.0212 2.1888 0.0958 0.4160 0.1253
POST_2YR 0.9633 0.9855 2.0591 0.0245 0.4747 -0.1129
POST_3YR 1.1091 1.0524 2.8279 0.0276 0.5930 0.4159
INDBOARD 0.6541 0.6833 1.0000 0.0000 0.2127 -1.0287
BUSYIND 7.2259 4.4375 53.1667 0.0000 8.4235 1.7939
FCF_MV 0.0981 0.0639 11.4306 -13.6013 2.7677 -0.8373
DEALVOL 26.2661 24.0000 40.0000 10.0000 8.5459 0.0908
DEALSIZE 8.0196 7.9352 9.9639 5.9908 0.7737 0.2549
RELSIZE -0.6085 -0.5354 1.3475 -2.9135 0.7478 -0.5042
BIDDERDEBT 0.4659 0.3553 2.4657 0.0000 0.4635 1.5374
PRIORBIDDERPERF 0.0459 0.0596 0.5014 -0.6717 0.0963 -2.5731
BIDDERSIZE 8.3759 8.4548 10.5265 5.3546 1.0494 -0.4653
Panel B: Sample Frequency for Busy Directors of the Pooled Sample
Count % Count % Count %
No 179 82.1 93 42.7 213 97.7
Yes 39 17.9 125 57.3 5 2.3
Panel C: Sample Frequency for Offer Types of the Pooled Sample
Count % Count % Count %
No 81 37.2 86 39.4 182 83.5
Yes 137 62.8 132 60.6 36 16.5









Where: POST/PREMIUM: post acquisition scaled by premium, where premium = price / price 20 days prior; POST_XY:
bidder's post acquisition share prices (1yr, 2yrs, 3yrs) / price 1 month prior; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of
independent director over total number of directors on board; BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of
board ind directors' seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH:
dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded with cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by
share issues; DEALSIZE: log transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition transaction (“Implied market value” –
Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year immediately preceding
the year of the acquisition announcement); BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition
announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition
announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement; TOP20_INSTIT: the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors that own more than 5 percent in the
 
Industries (GICS) # Firms % of Obs.
Capital Goods 13 5.96%
Commercial & Professional Services 10 4.59%
Consumer Services 18 8.26%
Diversified Financials 15 6.88%
Energy 12 5.50%
Food & Staples Retailing 5 2.29%
Food Beverage & Tobacco 14 6.42%




Metals & Mining 12 5.50%
Paper & Forest Products 2 0.92%
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 6 2.75%
Real Estate 17 7.80%
Retailing 3 1.38%
Software & Services 7 3.21%
Technology Hardware & Equipment 3 1.38%










POST_1Y_PREMIUM 0.8061 *** 0.6354 *** 0.9308 *** 0.7635 *** 0.5759 *** 0.0686 0.2566 *** 0.1065 0.0519 0.3026 *** -0.0636 -0.0003
POST_2Y_PREMIUM 0.7775 *** 0.8211 *** 0.7359 *** 0.9569 *** 0.7594 *** 0.1581 0.2795 *** 0.1001 -0.0528 0.3584 *** -0.0541 -0.0783
POST_3Y_PREMIUM 0.5954 *** 0.8028 *** 0.5674 *** 0.7778 *** 0.9606 *** 0.1961 0.3691 *** 0.1344 -0.0338 0.3607 *** -0.1149 -0.1083
POST_1YR 0.9235 *** 0.6878 *** 0.5125 *** 0.7966 *** 0.6031 *** 0.1336 0.2821 *** 0.1677 0.0725 0.2662 *** -0.1243 -0.0134
POST_2YR 0.7544 *** 0.9544 *** 0.7610 *** 0.7675 *** 0.7954 *** 0.2058 0.3023 *** 0.1462 -0.0455 0.3257 *** -0.0991 -0.0844
POST_3YR 0.5563 *** 0.7511 *** 0.9683 *** 0.5575 *** 0.7776 *** 0.2408 *** 0.3947 *** 0.1758 -0.0212 0.3281 *** -0.1654 -0.1058
INDBOARD 0.1180 0.2046 0.2588 *** 0.1800 0.2608 *** 0.3140 *** 0.4822 *** -0.0313 0.0217 0.1363 -0.1331 0.0606
BUSYIND 0.2766 *** 0.3479 *** 0.4356 *** 0.2892 *** 0.3612 *** 0.4587 *** 0.5355 *** 0.3078 *** 0.2655 *** 0.3965 *** -0.3115 *** 0.1192
FCF_MV 0.2338 *** 0.2796 *** 0.2852 *** 0.2801 *** 0.3188 *** 0.3155 *** 0.0806 0.3681 *** 0.1640 0.1181 -0.0005 -0.0905
DEALVOL -0.0041 -0.0902 -0.0541 0.0312 -0.0649 -0.0277 0.0275 0.2972 *** 0.1504 0.2281 -0.1150 0.0812
DEALSIZE 0.3202 *** 0.3352 *** 0.3798 *** 0.2705 *** 0.3144 *** 0.3691 *** 0.1595 0.4727 *** 0.1742 0.2035 0.0258 0.1646
RELSIZE -0.1211 -0.1008 -0.1649 -0.1565 -0.1322 -0.2001 -0.1176 -0.2835 *** -0.3093 *** -0.1179 0.0272 -0.2835 ***
BIDDERDEBT 0.0284 -0.0067 -0.0046 0.0504 0.0174 0.0203 0.0637 0.2314 0.0395 0.0998 0.2512 *** -0.3335 ***
PRIORBIDDERPERF 0.0664 0.0405 -0.0410 0.1130 0.0727 -0.0159 0.0923 0.0900 0.1322 -0.0084 0.3042 *** 0.0085 0.0435
BIDDERSIZE 0.2772 *** 0.2524 *** 0.2793 *** 0.2896 *** 0.2711 *** 0.3001 *** 0.2393 *** 0.5349 *** 0.4030 *** 0.2477 *** 0.6326 *** -0.4491 *** 0.5047 ***
TOP20_INSTIT -0.0344 -0.0226 0.0700 -0.0703 -0.0556 0.0579 0.0850 0.0913 0.0675 -0.0992 0.1015 0.0022 0.1536
Where: POST/PREMIUM: post acquisition scaled by premium, where premium = price / price 20 days prior; POST_XY: bidder's post acquisition share prices (1yr, 2yrs, 3yrs) / price 1 month prior; INDBOARD:
independent director over total number of directors on board; BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of board ind directors' seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market
transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition transaction (“Implied market value” – Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year immediately
announcement); BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition
natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement; TOP20_INSTIT: the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors that own more than 5 percent in the bidder firm; 
*** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level; The Person Correlations are above the diagonal and the Spearman's rho statistics are below the diagonal. 
BUSYIND FCF_MV DEALVOL DEALSIZE RELSIZE BIDDERDEBT 
Spearman's rho
TABLE 4







PREMIUM POST_1YR POST_2YR POST_3YR INDBOARD 
 
PANEL A: POST ACQUISITION / PREMIUM - OLS REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) 0.6144 0.8062 0.7351 -0.1856 0.0422 -0.1077 -0.1654 0.2494 0.7948
1.1653 1.5414 1.4606 -0.4851 0.1136 -0.2988 -0.2894 0.4215 1.1303
INDBOARD (+) 0.1092 0.0162 -0.0124 0.1561 0.0462 0.0445 0.4453 0.2148 0.1917
0.7818 0.1063 -0.0778 1.0546 0.3053 0.2740 2.3538 ** 1.0932 0.9181
BUSYIND (-) 0.0061 0.0068 0.0070 0.0078 0.0131 0.0201
1.8197 ** 1.9683 ** 1.5349 * 1.6793 ** 1.9518 ** 3.4709 ***
FCF_IMV (+) -0.0001 0.0102 0.0429
-0.0147 0.8543 3.1181 ***
BUSYIND*FCF_IMV (-) 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0022
0.0486 -1.7170 ** -3.8653 ***
OFFERCASH (-/+) -0.1291 -0.1260 -0.1158 -0.2405 -0.2359 -0.2359 -0.1910 -0.1712 -0.1641
-1.9716 * -1.8858 * -1.6944 * -2.4264 ** -2.3593 ** -2.3217 ** -1.7527 * -1.6069 -1.4667
OFFERSCRIP (-/+) -0.1982 -0.2014 -0.2105 -0.2126 -0.2136 -0.2284 -0.3656 -0.3539 -0.3302
-3.0029 *** -3.0309 *** -3.0775 *** -2.4036 ** -2.3903 ** -2.5696 ** -2.9826 *** -2.9754 *** -2.7355 ***
DEALVOL (-/+) -0.0040 -0.0045 -0.0039 -0.0086 -0.0090 -0.0057 -0.0128 -0.0180 -0.0155
-0.6311 -0.7123 -0.5694 -1.1626 -1.1984 -0.7950 -0.9420 -1.3532 -1.1058
DEALSIZE (-/+) 0.0575 0.0499 0.0426 0.1320 0.1229 0.1249 0.1285 0.1140 0.0854
1.0179 0.8764 0.7048 1.8756 * 1.7033 * 1.6826 * 1.1869 1.0744 0.7686
RELSIZE (-/+) 0.0360 0.0436 0.0484 -0.0375 -0.0274 -0.0122 0.0228 0.0639 0.0109
0.6526 0.7921 0.8133 -0.5446 -0.3940 -0.1605 0.2473 0.6630 0.1081
BIDDERDEBT (-/+) 0.0202 0.0305 0.0292 -0.0133 0.0011 0.0080 -0.0911 -0.0965 -0.0661
0.3430 0.5144 0.4827 -0.1642 0.0130 0.0958 -0.9103 -1.0412 -0.8083
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) 0.1743 0.2085 0.2409 -0.0171 0.0429 0.0721 -1.0490 -1.0382 -0.9533
0.4122 0.4907 0.5466 -0.0428 0.1081 0.1779 -1.4384 -1.3991 -1.3334
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) -0.0019 -0.0150 -0.0229 -0.0032 -0.0196 -0.0264 0.0388 0.0179 -0.0134
-0.0355 -0.2885 -0.4284 -0.0453 -0.2817 -0.3734 0.4305 0.2009 -0.1546
TOP20_INSTIT_5P (-/+) 0.0019 0.0021 0.0023 0.0005 0.0006 0.0002 0.0010 0.0008 0.0010
1.4379 1.6307 1.7012 * 0.2825 0.3542 0.1348 0.5584 0.4606 0.5059
Adjusted R-squared 0.2925 0.2958 0.2976 0.3633 0.3670 0.3702 0.3664 0.3904 0.4203
F-statistic 2.8602 2.8444 2.7441 3.2676 3.2487 3.1325 3.2251 3.3926 3.4971
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of Obs. 181 181 178 160 160 157 128 128 125
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-tailed for non-predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; ** 
Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level
Where: POST/PREMIUM: post acquisition scaled by premium, where premium = price / price 20 days prior; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of independent director over total number of directors on board;
BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of board ind directors' seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH: dummy variable for acquisitions that
are funded with cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by share issues; DEALSIZE: log transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition transaction (“Implied market value”
Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year immediately preceding the year of the acquisition announcement); BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio
immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the
acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement; TOP20_INSTIT: the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors that own more than 5 percent in the bidder firm; 
TABLE 5
Primary Hypothesis Tests
POST ACQUISITION 1YR / PREMIUM POST ACQUISITION 2YRS / PREMIUM POST ACQUISITION 3YRS / PREMIUM
PANEL B: CONFLICT ACQUISITION - POISSON COUNT REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) -1.3441 -1.5600 -1.1412
-1.0681 -1.1554 -0.8145
INDBOARD (-) -0.2195 -0.1043 -0.1717
-0.4427 -0.1859 -0.3015






BIDDERDEBT (-/+) -0.4186 -0.4174 -0.3525
-1.5890 -1.5926 -1.3202
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) 3.4329 3.4187 3.2308
2.2414 ** 2.2409 ** 2.0243 **
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) 0.1936 0.2149 0.1828
1.7542 * 1.7881 * 1.4817
Adjusted R-squared 0.2894 0.2873 0.2858
LR statistic 91.9736 92.1671 93.1415
Prob(LR statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of Obs. 217 217 215
Where: CONFLICT: amount of institutial conflict, director conflict and major stakeholder conflict; INDBOARD: calculated by
the number of independent director over total number of directors on board; BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total
no. of board ind directors' seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; BIDDERDEBT:
bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on
assets for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total




Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-
tailed for non-predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.05
level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level
 
PANEL C: POST ACQUISITION SHARE PERFORMANCE - OLS REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) 1.2816 1.4803 0.9348 -0.1630 0.1353 -0.0301 0.1692 0.5548 0.9966
2.0776 ** 2.3084 ** 1.7331 * -0.3018 0.2483 -0.0659 0.2735 0.8516 1.3312
INDBOARD (+) 0.2950 0.2132 0.2257 0.3091 0.1825 0.1929 0.6806 0.4541 0.4566
2.1119 ** 1.4033 * 1.4154 * 2.0366 ** 1.1285 1.1393 3.1293 *** 1.9535 ** 1.8872 **
BUSYIND (-) 0.0049 0.0046 0.0074 0.0080 0.0122 0.0183
1.2969 * 1.0652 1.4648 * 1.8121 ** 1.5937 * 2.9513 ***
FCF_IMV (+) 0.0062 0.0123 0.0583
0.5717 0.8916 3.6988 ***
BUSYIND*FCF_IMV (-) -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0027
-0.7391 -2.6539 *** -4.0580 ***
OFFERCASH (-/+) -0.1399 -0.1369 -0.1412 -0.2560 -0.2488 -0.2857 -0.2091 -0.1862 -0.1859
-1.8347 * -1.7601 * -1.8304 * -2.2327 ** -2.1312 ** -2.5167 ** -1.7427 * -1.5320 -1.4604
OFFERSCRIP (-/+) -0.2297 -0.2302 -0.2357 -0.2651 -0.2618 -0.2896 -0.4556 -0.4349 -0.4050
-2.9581 *** -2.9588 *** -3.0007 *** -2.4881 ** -2.4334 ** -2.7548 *** -3.5931 *** -3.4778 *** -3.1355 ***
DEALVOL (-/+) 0.0031 0.0028 0.0029 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0005 -0.0082 -0.0129 -0.0121
0.3903 0.3574 0.3444 -0.2243 -0.2424 -0.0635 -0.5711 -0.9292 -0.8634
DEALSIZE (-/+) 0.0413 0.0331 0.0387 0.1345 0.1209 0.1474 0.1353 0.1261 0.1007
0.6191 0.4928 0.5631 1.6931 * 1.4982 1.7717 * 1.1476 1.0831 0.8321
RELSIZE (-/+) 0.0153 0.0224 0.0297 -0.0668 -0.0542 -0.0261 -0.0147 0.0078 -0.0378
0.2361 0.3460 0.4401 -0.8539 -0.6994 -0.3318 -0.1502 0.0790 -0.3613
BIDDERDEBT (-/+) 0.0360 0.0417 0.0450 -0.0190 -0.0086 0.0146 -0.0598 -0.0589 -0.0216
0.5550 0.6489 0.6825 -0.2114 -0.0970 0.1645 -0.5113 -0.5309 -0.2178
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) 0.7850 0.8057 0.7871 0.5158 0.5627 0.5478 -0.7738 -0.7001 -0.6823
1.8430 * 1.8586 * 1.7872 * 1.2658 1.3568 1.3459 -1.1978 -1.0862 -1.0517
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) -0.0366 -0.0469 -0.0468 -0.0211 -0.0366 -0.0392 -0.0106 -0.0372 -0.0601
-0.5524 -0.7056 -0.6980 -0.2526 -0.4448 -0.4742 -0.0953 -0.3276 -0.5298
TOP20_INSTIT_5P (-/+) 0.0008 0.0010 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0017
0.5885 0.7033 0.4992 -0.2690 -0.2168 -0.7970 -0.5717 -0.6757 -0.8512
Adjusted R-squared 0.3398 0.3398 0.3385 0.3929 0.3966 0.4073 0.3438 0.3577 0.3878
F-statistic 3.1325 3.1325 3.1325 3.6681 3.6446 3.7155 3.1588 3.2276 3.3406
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of Obs. 192 192 189 170 170 167 137 137 134
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-tailed for non-predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 
level; ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level
Where: POST_XY: bidder's post acquisition share prices (1yr, 2yrs, 3yrs) / price 1 month prior; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of independent director over total number of directors on board; BUSYIND:
(no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of board ind directors' seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH: dummy variable for acquisitions that are
funded with cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by share issues; DEALSIZE: log transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition transaction (“Implied market value” –
Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year immediately preceding the year of the acquisition announcement); BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity
ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log
transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement; TOP20_INSTIT: the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors that own more than 5
percent in the bidder firm; 
TABLE 5 Continue...
Primary Hypothesis Tests
POST ACQUISITION 1YR POST ACQUISITION 2YRS POST ACQUISITION 3YRS
 
PANEL A: POST ACQUISITION / PREMIUM - OLS REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) 0.6144 0.8313 0.7667 -0.1856 0.1060 -0.0097 -0.1654 0.5414 1.1966
1.1653 1.5428 1.4765 -0.4851 0.2695 -0.0258 -0.2894 0.7528 1.5232
INDBOARD (+) 0.1092 0.0149 -0.0124 0.1561 0.1110 0.1004 0.4453 0.3153 0.2805
0.7818 0.0934 -0.0756 1.0546 0.7073 0.6069 2.3538 ** 1.6897 ** 1.4135 *
BUSYCEO (-) -0.0681 -0.1082 0.0194 -0.0243 -0.1402 -0.2080
-0.9037 -1.6396 * 0.1981 -0.2559 -1.0949 -1.7378 **
BUSYCHAIR (-) -0.0004 -0.0132 -0.0994 -0.1107 -0.0768 -0.1383
-0.0059 -0.2049 -1.7065 ** -1.8453 ** -0.9207 -1.6639 **
BUSYNONIND (-) -0.0031 -0.0031 0.0122 0.0089 0.0236 0.0095
-0.2093 -0.1899 0.8677 0.5739 1.4777 * 0.5868
BUSYIND (-) 0.0072 0.0087 0.0064 0.0084 0.0143 0.0250
1.9822 ** 2.2300 ** 1.2769 1.5745 * 1.9983 ** 3.8617 ***
FCF_IMV (+) 0.0008 0.0098 0.0449
0.0751 0.7355 3.2103 ***
BUSYIND*FCF_IMV (-) -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0025
-0.1604 -1.7254 ** -4.8344 ***
OFFERCASH (-/+) -0.1291 -0.1218 -0.1116 -0.2405 -0.2692 -0.2630 -0.1910 -0.1783 -0.1768
-1.9716 * -1.7588 * -1.6286 -2.4264 ** -2.7258 *** -2.6347 *** -1.7527 * -1.7253 * -1.6833 *
OFFERSCRIP (-/+) -0.1982 -0.1953 -0.2039 -0.2126 -0.2344 -0.2447 -0.3656 -0.3755 -0.3624
-3.0029 *** -2.9608 *** -3.0472 *** -2.4036 ** -2.6385 *** -2.7532 *** -2.9826 *** -3.2874 *** -3.2186 ***
DEALVOL (-/+) -0.0040 -0.0052 -0.0049 -0.0086 -0.0085 -0.0060 -0.0128 -0.0226 -0.0197
-0.6311 -0.8202 -0.7184 -1.1626 -1.0945 -0.7986 -0.9420 -1.4583 -1.1909
DEALSIZE (-/+) 0.0575 0.0475 0.0377 0.1320 0.1265 0.1224 0.1285 0.1174 0.0931
1.0179 0.8387 0.6250 1.8756 * 1.7616 * 1.6409 1.1869 1.1313 0.8645
RELSIZE (-/+) 0.0360 0.0482 0.0551 -0.0375 -0.0373 -0.0173 0.0228 0.0637 0.0127
0.6526 0.8709 0.9309 -0.5446 -0.5198 -0.2202 0.2473 0.6364 0.1192
BIDDERDEBT (-/+) 0.0202 0.0281 0.0243 -0.0133 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0911 -0.1061 -0.0725
0.3430 0.4717 0.4034 -0.1642 0.0162 0.0153 -0.9103 -1.1068 -0.8455
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) 0.1743 0.1936 0.2244 -0.0171 0.0822 0.1044 -1.0490 -0.9342 -0.7841
0.4122 0.4633 0.5212 -0.0428 0.2050 0.2565 -1.4384 -1.1912 -1.0383
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) -0.0019 -0.0118 -0.0188 -0.0032 -0.0243 -0.0270 0.0388 -0.0004 -0.0391
-0.0355 -0.2194 -0.3425 -0.0453 -0.3461 -0.3840 0.4305 -0.0047 -0.4650
TOP20_INSTIT_5P (-/+) 0.0019 0.0020 0.0022 0.0005 0.0006 0.0002 0.0010 0.0008 0.0006
1.4379 1.5356 1.5419 0.2825 0.3518 0.1031 0.5584 0.4218 0.3151
Adjusted R-squared 0.2925 0.2845 0.2918 0.3633 0.3684 0.3728 0.3664 0.3929 0.4355
F-statistic 2.8602 2.6265 2.5853 3.2676 3.1074 3.0156 3.2251 3.0156 3.4533
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of Obs. 181 181 178 160 160 157 128 128 125
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-tailed for non-predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 
level; ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level
Where: POST/PREMIUM: post acquisition scaled by premium, where premium = price / price 20 days prior; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of independent director over total number of directors on
board; BUSYCEO: dummy variable for CEOs who are busy; BUSYCHAIR: dummy variable for Chairpersons who are busy; BUSYNONIND: (no. of nonind directors/total directors) * total no. of board nonind
directors' seats; BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of board ind directors' seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH: dummy
variable for acquisitions that are funded with cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by share issues; DEALSIZE: log transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition
transaction (“Implied market value” – Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year immediately preceding the year of the acquisition announcement);
BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement;
BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement; TOP20_INSTIT: the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors that own more than 
TABLE 6
Decomposition Regressions
POST ACQUISITION 1YR / PREMIUM POST ACQUISITION 2YRS / PREMIUM POST ACQUISITION 3YRS / PREMIUM
 
PANEL B: CONFLICT ACQUISITION - POISSON COUNT REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) -1.3441 -2.1140 -1.6098
-1.0681 -1.4701 -1.0903
INDBOARD (-) -0.2195 -0.2308 -0.3431
-0.4427 -0.3935 -0.5750
BUSYCEO (+) 0.1173 0.1909
0.4479 0.7190
BUSYCHAIR (+) 0.4478 0.4941
2.1975 ** 2.3525 ***
BUSYNONIND (+) -0.0297 -0.0293
-0.4751 -0.4681






BIDDERDEBT -0.4186 -0.4291 -0.3559
-1.5890 -1.6069 -1.3054
PRIORBIDDERPERF 3.4329 3.0776 2.9570
2.2414 ** 1.9960 ** 1.8416 *
BIDDERSIZE 0.1936 0.2238 0.1900
1.7542 * 1.7794 * 1.4678
Adjusted R-squared 0.2894 0.3144 0.3194
LR statistic 91.9736 97.4242 99.3194
Prob(LR statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of Obs. 217 217 215
Where: CONFLICT: amount of institutial conflict, director conflict and major stakeholder conflict; INDBOARD: calculated by
the number of independent director over total number of directors on board; BUSYCEO: dummy variable for CEOs who are busy;
BUSYCHAIR: dummy variable for Chairpersons who are busy; BUSYNONIND: (no. of nonind directors/total directors) * total
no. of board nonind directors' seats; BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of board ind directors' seats;
FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio
immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years
prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year




Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-
tailed for non-predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.05
level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level
 
PANEL C: POST ACQUISITION SHARE PERFORMANCE - OLS REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) 1.2816 1.6024 0.8905 -0.1630 0.3352 0.0218 0.1692 0.8214 1.4409
2.0776 ** 2.4229 ** 1.5844 -0.3018 0.5844 0.0458 0.2735 1.1102 1.7346 *
INDBOARD (+) 0.2950 0.2326 0.2396 0.3091 0.2887 0.2790 0.6806 0.6117 0.5621
2.1119 ** 1.4971 * 1.4792 * 2.0366 ** 1.6050 * 1.5218 * 3.1293 *** 2.6746 *** 2.3912 ***
BUSYCEO (-) -0.0722 -0.0799 0.0022 -0.0254 -0.1553 -0.2179
-1.0088 -1.1128 0.0233 -0.2720 -1.1510 -1.6211 *
BUSYCHAIR (-) -0.0815 -0.0802 -0.1519 -0.1697 -0.1737 -0.2226
-1.3355 * -1.3050 * -2.4206 *** -2.7861 *** -1.8686 ** -2.4255 ***
BUSYNONIND (-) -0.0020 -0.0044 0.0182 0.0110 0.0240 0.0048
-0.1295 -0.2666 1.1713 0.7115 1.3852 * 0.2915
BUSYIND (-) 0.0068 0.0071 0.0067 0.0092 0.0137 0.0252
1.5424 * 1.4223 * 1.1839 1.7267 ** 1.6411 * 3.6341 ***
FCF_IMV (+) 0.0068 0.0122 0.0601
0.5477 0.8043 3.3927 ***
BUSYIND*FCF_IMV (-) -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0032
-0.8898 -2.8199 *** -5.1763 ***
OFFERCASH (-/+) -0.1399 -0.1525 -0.1551 -0.2560 -0.2894 -0.3195 -0.2091 -0.2177 -0.2196
-1.8347 * -2.0094 ** -2.0788 ** -2.2327 ** -2.6376 *** -2.8913 *** -1.7427 * -1.8050 * -1.7479 *
OFFERSCRIP (-/+) -0.2297 -0.2393 -0.2420 -0.2651 -0.2893 -0.3113 -0.4556 -0.4745 -0.4470
-2.9581 *** -3.1116 *** -3.1352 *** -2.4881 ** -2.8236 *** -3.0307 *** -3.5931 *** -3.8984 *** -3.6022 ***
DEALVOL (-/+) 0.0031 0.0024 0.0029 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0082 -0.0183 -0.0164
0.3903 0.3153 0.3408 -0.2243 -0.1674 -0.0115 -0.5711 -1.1516 -1.0180
DEALSIZE (-/+) 0.0413 0.0311 0.0352 0.1345 0.1243 0.1445 0.1353 0.1407 0.1103
0.6191 0.4630 0.5063 1.6931 * 1.5606 1.7406 * 1.1476 1.2104 0.9082
RELSIZE (-/+) 0.0153 0.0265 0.0295 -0.0668 -0.0661 -0.0410 -0.0147 0.0014 -0.0383
0.2361 0.3989 0.4277 -0.8539 -0.8138 -0.4985 -0.1502 0.0129 -0.3351
BIDDERDEBT (-/+) 0.0360 0.0396 0.0409 -0.0190 -0.0117 0.0051 -0.0598 -0.0679 -0.0260
0.5550 0.6102 0.6134 -0.2114 -0.1324 0.0582 -0.5113 -0.5719 -0.2458
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) 0.7850 0.8001 0.7921 0.5158 0.6155 0.6180 -0.7738 -0.5404 -0.4316
1.8430 * 1.8235 * 1.7660 * 1.2658 1.4316 1.4611 -1.1978 -0.7687 -0.6069
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) -0.0366 -0.0397 -0.0398 -0.0211 -0.0432 -0.0420 -0.0106 -0.0571 -0.0843
-0.5524 -0.5918 -0.5911 -0.2526 -0.5164 -0.5015 -0.0953 -0.5163 -0.7601
TOP20_INSTIT_5P (-/+) 0.0008 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0021
0.5885 0.6318 0.4094 -0.2690 -0.2817 -0.9078 -0.5717 -0.7328 -0.9593
Adjusted R-squared 0.3398 0.3373 0.3364 0.3929 0.4101 0.4242 0.3438 0.3722 0.4141
F-statistic 3.3981 3.1601 3.1175 3.6681 3.6111 3.7174 3.1588 3.1789 3.4101
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of Obs. 192 192 189 170 170 167 137 137 134
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-tailed for non-predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 
level; ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level
Where: POST_XY: bidder's post acquisition share prices (1yr, 2yrs, 3yrs) / price 1 month prior; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of independent director over total number of directors on board;
BUSYCEO: dummy variable for CEOs who are busy; BUSYCHAIR: dummy variable for Chairpersons who are busy; BUSYNONIND: (no. of nonind directors/total directors) * total no. of board nonind directors'
seats; BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of board ind directors' seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH: dummy variable for
acquisitions that are funded with cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by share issues; DEALSIZE: log transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition transaction (“Implied
market value” – Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year immediately preceding the year of the acquisition announcement); BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s
debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log
transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement; TOP20_INSTIT: the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors that own more than 5 percent in the bidder firm
TABLE 6 Continue...
Decomposition Regressions
POST ACQUISITION 1YR POST ACQUISITION 2YRS POST ACQUISITION 3YRS
 
PANEL A: POST ACQUISITION / PREMIUM - OLS REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) 0.6144 0.7822 0.7259 -0.1856 -0.0422 -0.1584 -0.1654 0.2346 0.9296
1.1653 1.4658 1.4067 -0.4851 -0.1046 -0.3943 -0.2894 0.3453 1.2194
INDBOARD (+) 0.1092 0.1052 0.0884 0.1561 0.2190 0.2361 0.4453 0.4346 0.4997
0.7818 0.7320 0.5971 1.0546 1.5039 * 1.5660 * 2.3538 ** 2.1473 ** 2.5008 ***
BUSYCEO (-) -0.0615 -0.1051 0.0150 -0.0319 -0.1186 -0.1839
-0.8375 -1.6637 ** 0.1513 -0.3266 -0.8992 -1.4736 *
BUSYCHAIR (-) 0.0123 0.0001 -0.0892 -0.0966 -0.0672 -0.1176
0.1941 0.0017 -1.5270 * -1.5793 * -0.8139 -1.4305 *
BUSYNONIND_W (-) 0.0594 0.0583 0.1297 0.1447 -0.0081 -0.0188
1.0377 1.0285 2.1897 ** 2.4570 *** -0.1044 -0.2172
BUSYIND_W (-) 0.0055 0.0077 0.0064 0.0088 0.0112 0.0187
1.6138 * 2.0941 ** 1.3897 * 1.7153 ** 1.8018 ** 3.1343 ***
FCF_IMV (+) 0.0023 0.0109 0.0515
0.2407 0.8288 3.2414 ***
BUSYIND_W*FCF_IMV (-) -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0024
-0.5321 -2.2036 ** -4.1920 ***
OFFERCASH (-/+) -0.1291 -0.1267 -0.1150 -0.2405 -0.2942 -0.2897 -0.1910 -0.1892 -0.1788
-1.9716 * -1.7902 * -1.6533 -2.4264 ** -2.8176 *** -2.7382 *** -1.7527 * -1.7316 * -1.6455
OFFERSCRIP (-/+) -0.1982 -0.1979 -0.2057 -0.2126 -0.2498 -0.2601 -0.3656 -0.3738 -0.3605
-3.0029 *** -2.9689 *** -3.0174 *** -2.4036 ** -2.8154 *** -2.9725 *** -2.9826 *** -3.1136 *** -3.0174 ***
DEALVOL (-/+) -0.0040 -0.0035 -0.0030 -0.0086 -0.0047 -0.0010 -0.0128 -0.0191 -0.0172
-0.6311 -0.5128 -0.4127 -1.1626 -0.6236 -0.1396 -0.9420 -1.3402 -1.1501
DEALSIZE (-/+) 0.0575 0.0496 0.0393 0.1320 0.1336 0.1263 0.1285 0.1337 0.1160
1.0179 0.8897 0.6672 1.8756 * 1.9265 * 1.7658 * 1.1869 1.2693 1.0726
RELSIZE (-/+) 0.0360 0.0391 0.0473 -0.0375 -0.0523 -0.0318 0.0228 0.0482 -0.0126
0.6526 0.7126 0.8048 -0.5446 -0.7283 -0.4070 0.2473 0.4693 -0.1162
BIDDERDEBT (-/+) 0.0202 0.0327 0.0275 -0.0133 0.0240 0.0288 -0.0911 -0.1030 -0.0737
0.3430 0.5464 0.4529 -0.1642 0.2819 0.3333 -0.9103 -0.9851 -0.7947
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) 0.1743 0.2339 0.2662 -0.0171 0.2065 0.2618 -1.0490 -0.9522 -0.7993
0.4122 0.5538 0.6157 -0.0428 0.5168 0.6518 -1.4384 -1.2006 -1.0394
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) -0.0019 -0.0186 -0.0275 -0.0032 -0.0364 -0.0434 0.0388 0.0089 -0.0447
-0.0355 -0.3293 -0.4773 -0.0453 -0.4891 -0.5863 0.4305 0.0939 -0.4743
TOP20_INSTIT_5P (-/+) 0.0019 0.0020 0.0022 0.0005 0.0005 0.0001 0.0010 0.0007 0.0009
1.4379 1.5552 1.5718 0.2825 0.2949 0.0580 0.5584 0.3887 0.4706
Adjusted R-squared 0.2925 0.2854 0.2944 0.3633 0.3794 0.3894 0.3664 0.3715 0.4158
F-statistic 2.8602 2.6337 2.6051 3.2676 3.2088 3.1626 3.2251 3.0291 3.2627
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of Obs. 181 181 178 160 160 157 128 128 125
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-tailed for non-predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 
level; ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level
Where: POST/PREMIUM: post acquisition scaled by premium, where premium = price / price 20 days prior; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of independent director over total number of directors on
board; BUSYCEO: dummy variable for CEOs who are busy; BUSYCHAIR: dummy variable for Chairpersons who are busy; BUSYNONIND_W: weighted BUSYNONIND, where (CEO, Nonind)=4;
(Chairperson)=2; (Independent)=1; (Misc)=0.5; BUSYIND_W: weighted BUSYIND, where (CEO, Nonind)=4; (Chairperson)=2; (Independent)=1; (Misc)=0.5; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by
implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded with cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by share issues; DEALSIZE: log
transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition transaction (“Implied market value” – Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year immediately
preceding the year of the acquisition announcement); BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for
the three years prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement; TOP20_INSTIT: the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors that own more than 
TABLE 7
Weight adjusted for different types of outside directorships - where CEO and Non-Independent = 4, Chairperson = 2, Misc = 0.5, and Independent = 1
POST ACQUISITION 1YR / PREMIUM POST ACQUISITION 2YRS / PREMIUM POST ACQUISITION 3YRS / PREMIUM
Decomposition Regressions - Weighted
 
PANEL B: CONFLICT ACQUISITION - POISSON COUNT REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) -1.3441 -2.4525 -1.9731
-1.0681 -1.6576 * -1.3060
INDBOARD (-) -0.2195 -0.4570 -0.5446
-0.4427 -0.8557 -1.0037
BUSYCEO (+) 0.2508 0.3365
0.9258 1.2371
BUSYCHAIR (+) 0.3926 0.4711
1.9544 ** 2.2749 **
BUSYNONIND_W (+) -0.0689 -0.0675
-1.3647 * -1.3303 *






BIDDERDEBT -0.4186 -0.4675 -0.3895
-1.5890 -1.7158 * -1.3971
PRIORBIDDERPERF 3.4329 2.6796 2.5605
2.2414 ** 1.7411 * 1.6063
BIDDERSIZE 0.1936 0.2705 0.2308
1.7542 * 2.0477 ** 1.7107 *
Adjusted R-squared 0.2894 0.3287 0.3475
LR statistic 91.97363 99.14401 102.2007
Prob(LR statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of Obs. 217 217 215
Where: CONFLICT: amount of institutial conflict, director conflict and major stakeholder conflict; INDBOARD: calculated by
the number of independent director over total number of directors on board; BUSYCEO: dummy variable for CEOs who are busy;
BUSYCHAIR: dummy variable for Chairpersons who are busy; BUSYNONIND_W: weighted BUSYNONIND, where (CEO,
Nonind)=4; (Chairperson)=2; (Independent)=1; (Misc)=0.5; BUSYIND_W: weighted BUSYIND, where (CEO, Nonind)=4;
(Chairperson)=2; (Independent)=1; (Misc)=0.5; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal;
BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer
average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of
the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement; Note on weighting approach - Harris
and Shimizu (2004) and Kiel and Nicholson (2006) also adopt a similar approach in their studies.
Decomposition Regressions - Weighted
TABLE 7 Continue...
Weight adjusted for different types of outside directorships - where CEO and Non-Independent = 4, Chairperson = 2, 
Misc = 0.5, and Independent = 1
CONFLICT
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-
tailed for non-predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; ** Coefficient is significant at the 0.05
level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level
 
PANEL C: POST ACQUISITION SHARE PERFORMANCE - OLS REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) 1.2816 1.6671 0.9248 -0.1630 0.2351 -0.1234 0.1692 0.5789 1.2733
2.0776 ** 2.4908 ** 1.6616 * -0.3018 0.3847 -0.2466 0.2735 0.8191 1.5773
INDBOARD (+) 0.2950 0.3150 0.3290 0.3091 0.3892 0.4280 0.6806 0.7229 0.7936
2.1119 ** 2.2634 ** 2.2730 ** 2.0366 ** 2.4916 *** 2.5822 *** 3.1293 *** 3.2036 *** 3.4276 ***
BUSYCEO (-) -0.0854 -0.0957 -0.0178 -0.0492 -0.1419 -0.2121
-1.2218 -1.3611 * -0.1817 -0.5124 -1.0083 -1.4502 *
BUSYCHAIR (-) -0.0706 -0.0701 -0.1460 -0.1591 -0.1609 -0.1996
-1.1486 -1.1361 -2.3543 *** -2.6409 *** -1.7495 ** -2.2443 **
BUSYNONIND_W (-) 0.0889 0.0930 0.1494 0.1807 0.0096 0.0030
1.2632 1.3489 * 2.5990 *** 3.1383 *** 0.1297 0.0353
BUSYIND_W (-) 0.0077 0.0082 0.0085 0.0101 0.0127 0.0210
1.9865 ** 1.9267 ** 1.5859 * 1.9409 ** 1.7921 ** 3.1216 ***
FCF_IMV (+) 0.0079 0.0130 0.0656
0.6881 0.8310 3.4228 ***
BUSYIND_W*FCF_IMV (-) -0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0032
-1.2552 -3.0631 *** -4.6618 ***
OFFERCASH (-/+) -0.1399 -0.1589 -0.1615 -0.2560 -0.3193 -0.3529 -0.2091 -0.2317 -0.2218
-1.8347 * -2.0502 ** -2.1255 ** -2.2327 ** -2.8007 *** -3.0997 *** -1.7427 * -1.8853 * -1.7801 *
OFFERSCRIP (-/+) -0.2297 -0.2449 -0.2475 -0.2651 -0.3082 -0.3297 -0.4556 -0.4779 -0.4519
-2.9581 *** -3.1548 *** -3.1458 *** -2.4881 ** -3.0576 *** -3.3024 *** -3.5931 *** -3.8303 *** -3.5126 ***
DEALVOL (-/+) 0.0031 0.0044 0.0050 -0.0020 0.0022 0.0055 -0.0082 -0.0156 -0.0142
0.3903 0.5506 0.5660 -0.2243 0.2596 0.7055 -0.5711 -1.0734 -0.9471
DEALSIZE (-/+) 0.0413 0.0299 0.0331 0.1345 0.1285 0.1437 0.1353 0.1492 0.1218
0.6191 0.4535 0.4899 1.6931 * 1.6597 * 1.7922 * 1.1476 1.2765 1.0124
RELSIZE (-/+) 0.0153 0.0175 0.0216 -0.0668 -0.0769 -0.0545 -0.0147 -0.0025 -0.0512
0.2361 0.2684 0.3146 -0.8539 -0.9442 -0.6576 -0.1502 -0.0228 -0.4477
BIDDERDEBT (-/+) 0.0360 0.0479 0.0496 -0.0190 0.0121 0.0334 -0.0598 -0.0675 -0.0310
0.5550 0.7440 0.7519 -0.2114 0.1325 0.3659 -0.5113 -0.5301 -0.2769
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) 0.7850 0.8572 0.8521 0.5158 0.7269 0.7626 -0.7738 -0.5634 -0.4492
1.8430 * 1.9520 * 1.8969 * 1.2658 1.7491 * 1.8974 * -1.1978 -0.7946 -0.6204
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) -0.0366 -0.0536 -0.0547 -0.0211 -0.0552 -0.0577 -0.0106 -0.0485 -0.0936
-0.5524 -0.7903 -0.8012 -0.2526 -0.6340 -0.6685 -0.0953 -0.4195 -0.7999
TOP20_INSTIT_5P (-/+) 0.0008 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0016
0.5885 0.7150 0.4642 -0.2690 -0.3964 -1.0116 -0.5717 -0.7855 -0.7976
Adjusted R-squared 0.3398 0.3476 0.3480 0.3929 0.4224 0.4434 0.3438 0.3604 0.4061
F-statistic 3.3981 3.2611 3.2302 3.6681 3.7469 3.9382 3.1588 3.0713 3.3318
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of Obs. 192 192 189 170 170 167 137 137 134
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-tailed for non-predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; ** 
Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; * Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level
Where: POST_XY: bidder's post acquisition share prices (1yr, 2yrs, 3yrs) / price 1 month prior; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of independent director over total number of directors on board; BUSYCEO:
dummy variable for CEOs who are busy; BUSYCHAIR: dummy variable for Chairpersons who are busy; BUSYNONIND_W: weighted BUSYNONIND, where (CEO, Nonind)=4; (Chairperson)=2; (Independent)=1;
(Misc)=0.5; BUSYIND_W: weighted BUSYIND, where (CEO, Nonind)=4; (Chairperson)=2; (Independent)=1; (Misc)=0.5; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH:
dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded with cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by share issues; DEALSIZE: log transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition
transaction (“Implied market value” – Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year immediately preceding the year of the acquisition announcement);
BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement;
BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement; TOP20_INSTIT: the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors that own more than 
TABLE 7 Continue...
Decomposition Regressions - Weighted
POST ACQUISITION 1YR POST ACQUISITION 2YRS POST ACQUISITION 3YRS
Weight adjusted for different types of outside directorships - where CEO and Non-Independent = 4, Chairperson = 2, Misc = 0.5, and Independent = 1
 
PANEL A: SHORT-TERM CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN - OLS REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) -0.2156 -0.1978 -0.1033
-1.9535 * -1.7851 * -0.9293
INDBOARD (+) 0.0118 -0.0044 -0.0206
0.3251 -0.1296 -0.6522
BUSYCEO (-) 0.0151 -0.0030 -0.0084
0.9676 -0.1956 -0.5473
BUSYCHAIR (-) 0.0155 0.0140 0.0146
1.1745 1.0687 1.1565
BUSYNONIND (-) 0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0009
0.3127 -0.3265 -0.2733
BUSYIND (-) -0.0006 0.0002 0.0002
-0.4297 0.1278 0.1432
FCF_IMV (+) -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0055
-1.2095 -1.2862 * -1.5200 *
BUSYIND*FCF_IMV (-) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.5811 0.5046 0.9514
OFFERCASH (-/+) -0.0027 -0.0167 -0.0178
-0.1686 -0.9265 -0.9149
OFFERSCRIP (-/+) 0.0025 0.0032 -0.0016
0.1449 0.1849 -0.0946
DEALVOL (-/+) 0.0008 0.0010 0.0004
0.5431 0.6132 0.3023
DEALSIZE (-/+) 0.0041 0.0074 0.0099
0.3235 0.6130 0.8528
RELSIZE (-/+) 0.0061 -0.0017 -0.0007
0.5077 -0.1397 -0.0585
BIDDERDEBT (-/+) 0.0477 0.0526 0.0534
2.5281 ** 2.6536 *** 2.9282 ***
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) -0.2783 -0.1885 -0.1493
-2.7747 *** -1.8923 * -1.1672
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) 0.0135 0.0083 0.0037
1.2987 0.8143 0.3535
TOP20_INSTIT (-/+) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
0.1206 -0.0733 0.5619
Adjusted R-squared 0.0694 0.0808 0.0529
F-statistic 1.3210 1.3744 1.2821
Prob(F-statistic) 0.1081 0.0795 0.1458
# of Obs. 199 197 198
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-tailed for non-
predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; ** 
Where: CAR: cumulative abnormal return; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of independent director over total number of directors on
board; BUSYCEO: dummy variable for CEOs who are busy; BUSYCHAIR: dummy variable for Chairpersons who are busy; BUSYNONIND:
(no. of nonind directors/total directors) * total no. of board nonind directors' seats; BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of
board ind directors' seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH: dummy variable for
acquisitions that are funded with cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by share issues; DEALVOL: total
acquisition activity (number of deal in excess of $1 Million) per year; DEALSIZE: log transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition
transaction (“Implied market value” – Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year
immediately preceding the year of the acquisition announcement); BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the
acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition
TABLE 8
Cumulative Abnormal Returns as Dependent Variables
CAR 2DAYS CAR 3DAYS CAR 3DAYS (BETA)
 
PANEL B: LONG-TERM CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN - OLS REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) -0.3370 1.1976 2.7719
-0.6382 1.5106 2.5178 **
INDBOARD (+) 0.4764 0.1323 0.2591
2.3038 ** 0.3892 0.5586
BUSYCEO (-) -0.0013 0.0789 0.1073
-0.0114 0.7359 0.6631
BUSYCHAIR (-) -0.1432 0.0053 -0.0645
-2.0418 ** 0.0395 -0.4289
BUSYNONIND (-) -0.0417 -0.0254 -0.0332
-2.3356 ** -0.7996 -0.8795
BUSYIND (-) 0.0029 -0.0113 -0.0155
0.4205 -1.2450 -1.2442
FCF_IMV (+) 0.0139 -0.0145 0.0172
0.6923 -0.4040 0.4372
BUSYIND*FCF_IMV (-) 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0012
0.5078 0.8391 -0.7697
OFFERCASH (-/+) 0.2178 0.0921 -0.0118
2.0059 ** 0.5597 -0.0564
OFFERSCRIP (-/+) 0.0048 -0.0512 -0.0493
0.0484 -0.3555 -0.2666
DEALVOL (-/+) 0.0113 0.0205 0.0195
1.4485 1.9001 * 1.2997
DEALSIZE (-/+) 0.0545 -0.0439 0.0143
0.6197 -0.3553 0.0742
RELSIZE (-/+) 0.0537 0.0469 -0.1291
0.5729 0.3445 -0.5557
BIDDERDEBT (-/+) 0.0740 -0.0625 -0.0245
0.9035 -0.4769 -0.1200
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) 0.3390 1.0950 3.1586
0.5025 1.5559 2.1257 **
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) -0.1119 -0.1756 -0.3474
-1.3690 -1.2222 -1.2856
TOP20_INSTIT (-/+) 0.0022 0.0012 -0.0039
1.2021 0.3582 -1.0059
Adjusted R-squared 0.2121 0.1325 0.1781
F-statistic 2.0945 1.5906 1.8943
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0006 0.0230 0.0045
# of Obs. 184 175 162
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-tailed for non-predicted
sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; ** 
Where: CAR: cumulative abnormal return; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of independent director over total number of directors on board;
BUSYCEO: dummy variable for CEOs who are busy; BUSYCHAIR: dummy variable for Chairpersons who are busy; BUSYNONIND: (no. of nonind
directors/total directors) * total no. of board nonind directors' seats; BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of board ind directors'
seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded with
cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by share issues; DEALVOL: total acquisition activity (number of deal in excess of
$1 Million) per year; DEALSIZE: log transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition transaction (“Implied market value” – Connect4); RELSIZE:
the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year immediately preceding the year of the acquisition announcement);
BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets
for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement
TABLE 13 Continue...
Cumulative Abnormal Returns as Dependent Variables
CAR 1YR CAR 2YRS CAR 3YRS
 
PANEL B: LONG-TERM CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN - OLS REGRESSIONS
INTERCEPT (-/+) -0.3370 1.1976 2.7719
-0.6382 1.5106 2.5178 **
INDBOARD (+) 0.4764 0.1323 0.2591
2.3038 ** 0.3892 0.5586
BUSYCEO (-) -0.0013 0.0789 0.1073
-0.0114 0.7359 0.6631
BUSYCHAIR (-) -0.1432 0.0053 -0.0645
-2.0418 ** 0.0395 -0.4289
BUSYNONIND (-) -0.0417 -0.0254 -0.0332
-2.3356 ** -0.7996 -0.8795
BUSYIND (-) 0.0029 -0.0113 -0.0155
0.4205 -1.2450 -1.2442
FCF_IMV (+) 0.0139 -0.0145 0.0172
0.6923 -0.4040 0.4372
BUSYIND*FCF_IMV (-) 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0012
0.5078 0.8391 -0.7697
OFFERCASH (-/+) 0.2178 0.0921 -0.0118
2.0059 ** 0.5597 -0.0564
OFFERSCRIP (-/+) 0.0048 -0.0512 -0.0493
0.0484 -0.3555 -0.2666
DEALVOL (-/+) 0.0113 0.0205 0.0195
1.4485 1.9001 * 1.2997
DEALSIZE (-/+) 0.0545 -0.0439 0.0143
0.6197 -0.3553 0.0742
RELSIZE (-/+) 0.0537 0.0469 -0.1291
0.5729 0.3445 -0.5557
BIDDERDEBT (-/+) 0.0740 -0.0625 -0.0245
0.9035 -0.4769 -0.1200
PRIORBIDDERPERF (-/+) 0.3390 1.0950 3.1586
0.5025 1.5559 2.1257 **
BIDDERSIZE (-/+) -0.1119 -0.1756 -0.3474
-1.3690 -1.2222 -1.2856
TOP20_INSTIT (-/+) 0.0022 0.0012 -0.0039
1.2021 0.3582 -1.0059
Adjusted R-squared 0.2121 0.1325 0.1781
F-statistic 2.0945 1.5906 1.8943
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0006 0.0230 0.0045
# of Obs. 184 175 162
Note: Year and GICS effects were controlled using dummy variables; t-Stats are one-tailed for predicted sign variables and two-tailed for non-
predicted sign variables; *** Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; ** 
Where: CAR: cumulative abnormal return; INDBOARD: calculated by the number of independent director over total number of directors on
board; BUSYCEO: dummy variable for CEOs who are busy; BUSYCHAIR: dummy variable for Chairpersons who are busy; BUSYNONIND:
(no. of nonind directors/total directors) * total no. of board nonind directors' seats; BUSYIND: (no. of ind directors/total directors)* total no. of
board ind directors' seats; FCF_IMV: bidder's free cash flow scaled by implied market value of the deal; OFFERCASH: dummy variable for
acquisitions that are funded with cash; OFFERSCRIP: dummy variable for acquisitions that are funded by share issues; DEALVOL: total
acquisition activity (number of deal in excess of $1 Million) per year; DEALSIZE: log transformation of total dollar value of the acquisition
transaction (“Implied market value” – Connect4); RELSIZE: the natural log of the quotient of target and bidder size (total assets in the year
immediately preceding the year of the acquisition announcement); BIDDERDEBT: bidder’s debt-to-equity ratio immediately before the
acquisition announcement; PRIORBIDDERPERF: acquirer average return on assets for the three years prior to the acquisition announcement; BIDDERSIZE: natural log transformation of the acquirer’s total revenue for the year immediately prior to the acquisition
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns as Dependent Variables
CAR 1YR CAR 2YRS CAR 3YRS
 
